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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 
Statement of the Problem 
 Imitation is generally defined as a means by which individuals copy another 
person’s behavior, emulating both the physical properties and connotation.  Imitation can 
take the form of one or a combination of three types: object imitation, gestural imitation, 
or oral-facial imitation.  Additionally, these types can be categorized as single (one 
behavior) or sequential (a series of connected behaviors), immediate (instant emulation 
following a model) or deferred (postponed emulation), and spontaneous (emulation 
occurs without prompt) or elicited (emulation directly prompted) (Sevlever & Gillis, 
2010). 
 Growth in imitation continues throughout early childhood.  By the time children 
are one year old, they engage in object imitation while playing with adults, copying 
adults’ play behaviors in regards to toys.  By the next year, children begin to play 
imitation games involving more gestures.  Typical development continues to reciprocal 
imitation, in which the child and adult imitate each other as an exchange that promotes 
relationship building.  This reciprocal imitation is thought to facilitate the development of 
language skills and early peer relationships, as children use object imitation to begin 
social interactions with each other (Eckerman & Stein, 1990; Eckerman & Didow, 1996).  
In toddlers, this type of interaction is the most common way of play between two children.  
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Through this continued use of imitation, children’s social skills mature and grow 
(Ingersoll, 2008).  
Unlike typically developing children, children with ASD – a neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterized by social and behavioral deficits (APA, 2014) – display 
qualitatively different behaviors in infancy, which may impact the ability to learn from 
imitation.  Specifically, research has shown that children with ASD smile less in reaction 
to their mothers’ smiles, rarely make eye contact, and lack preverbal behaviors during the 
first year of life (Dawson, Hill, Spencer, Galpert, & Watson, 1990).  These absent signals 
of early imitation make the later lack of imitation development somewhat unsurprising.  
Research has shown that children with ASD can imitate when the behavior is elicited.  
However, unlike their typically developing counterparts, children with ASD do not 
usually imitate spontaneously (Ingersoll, 2008; Whiten & Brown, 1999).    
 Research examining the effectiveness of different types of interventions in 
increasing imitative ability in children with ASD has found various types of imitation 
improve when using discrete trial training (Lovaas, 1987) and Reciprocal Imitation 
Training (Ingersoll, 2008).  However, the relative effectiveness of different interventions 
in improving the imitation skills of children with ASD has not been directly tested.  The 
current study investigated the effectiveness of two types of imitation interventions, 
teacher-directed (discrete trial training) and child-directed (a component of Reciprocal 
Imitation Training) to improve spontaneous imitation skills in children with ASD.  The 
effects of imitation training on the expressive language development in children with 
ASD were also be explored.   
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 It was hypothesized that discrete trial training would produce a slight increase in 
spontaneous imitation ability.  It was further hypothesized that even greater spontaneous 
imitation gains would be evidenced during the application of child-directed imitation 
training.  Finally, it was hypothesized that participants would demonstrate an increase in 
expressive language over the course of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), classified as a neurodevelopmental disorder, 
has shown a dramatic diagnostic increase over the past two decades (APA, 2014; Rice, 
2014).  Estimates indicate the current prevalence of the disorder averages one per every 
68 children (CDC, 2014). A diagnosis of ASD can be reliably given as early as the age of 
two years; however, the average age of diagnosis is at five years, seven months (Shattuck 
et al., 2009).  While the diagnosis can be given later – especially if placed in an 
environment with high social demands, such as school – a DSM diagnostic criterion 
requires that symptoms be evident early in development (APA, 2014).       
 The diagnostic criteria for ASD include two primary categories: social 
communication and social interaction deficits as well as limited repertoires of behaviors 
and interests.  Communication deficits are perhaps most marked, with approximately fifty 
percent of individuals with ASD never developing functional language (DeMyer, 1972; 
Smith, Mirenda, & Zaidman-Zait, 2007).  Even in those individuals who do speak, it is 
common for verbal behaviors to include stereotyped and repetitive language, including 
echolalic speech, limiting their ability to engage effectively in conversation with others.  
Significant deficits are also noted in receptive language skills, and individuals with ASD 
often have difficulties understanding spoken and written language.  Social deficits may 
include few, if any, peer relationships, a lack of mutual sharing of interests or feelings, 
and atypical nonverbal behaviors unsuitable in regards to normal social interaction (APA, 
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2014).  Finally, individuals with ASD typically exhibit a limited range of behaviors, 
interests, and activities.  Classic examples include stereotyped and repetitive motor 
behaviors, being insistent on following rigid schedules, exhibiting distress when expected 
routines are interrupted.  In addition to the categorical qualifications, these impairments 
must be evident in the early childhood years (before the age of eight), must significantly 
impair daily life functioning, and must not be the result of an intellectual disability or 
broader developmental delay.  Finally, an ASD diagnosis is given with a severity rating 
in terms of impairment, with ratings ranging from level one (“requiring support”) to level 
three (“requiring very substantial support”) (APA, 2014).   
Although not part of the diagnostic picture, deficits in imitation are widespread in 
individuals with ASD.  Researchers have debated whether poor imitation skill 
development it is a core deficit associated with the disorder (Rogers & Pennington, 1991) 
or the result of other associated symptoms, such as deficits in theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) or emotion recognition and understanding (Hobson, 1986a 
& 1986b).  Whether the imitation is a central deficit in ASD or a secondary effect of 
other impairments, it is one that affects development of communication and socialization 
skills, and is certainly a target for intervention (Rogers & Pennington, 1991). 
Typical Development of Imitation 
 In typically developing children, imitation capabilities can be seen at as early as 
twelve to twenty-one hours following birth.  Previous research has shown that infants of 
this age can imitate simple actions, such as sticking out one’s tongue, and twenty-four 
hours later can also imitate facial expressions including happy, sad, and surprise 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982).   Further, at six 
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weeks old, research has shown that infants are able to engage in deferred imitation of 
more complex motor routines, such as opening their mouths and sticking out their 
tongues twenty four hours after both actions were first shown to them (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1994).  At thirteen months, infants have the ability to truly imitate, meaning that they can 
understand a behavior’s purpose and therefore imitate that behavior with the intention to 
accomplish that purpose (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998).  As these infants are 
unable to verbally communicate, researchers have posed that this type of imitation may 
serve a communicative function (Nadel, 1982).  
 Imitation becomes increasingly prominent in children eighteen months and older, 
its use hitting its zenith when children are thirty months of age.  In children of this age, 
imitative social exchanges show norms of reciprocal communication such as taking turns 
and exchanging roles in a conversation (Nadel, 2002).  Additionally, these imitative 
exchanges occur with temporal consideration, each child participating in a give-and-take 
depending on the start and finish of each other’s actions.  Interestingly, widespread use of 
reciprocal imitation seems to decline as children develop language.  This implies not only 
imitation’s communicative function, but also children’s recognition of it as such (Nadel 
& Fontaine, 1989).   
 A crucial difference in imitation is the act of imitating another versus recognition 
of being imitated by another.  Imitating someone else is the initiation of a social 
contingency with that person, implying that one is gaining that person’s attention and 
then engaging him or her in a social exchange.  Being imitated, however, involves being 
prompted for a social exchange; in order for this contingency to succeed, the subject of 
the imitation must be able not only to know that someone is imitating him or her but also 
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to be able to reply to this social contingency.  Researchers hypothesize that the subject of 
the imitation understands the act as intentional (Nadel, 1982).  While this socially-
oriented theory explains the imitation deficit in ASD as a lack of understanding of 
imitation’s social contingency, other theories have proposed a variety of different 
explanations for the impairment. 
Development of Imitation in ASD 
Individuals with ASD often exhibit differences in the amount and quality of 
imitation behaviors compared to their typical peer counterparts throughout childhood 
(Ingersoll, 2008).  Several theories have been proposed to explain the source of the 
imitation deficits found in individuals with autism spectrum disorder.  While these 
theories all recognize that imitation deficits exist and agree that imitation is an important 
precursor to academic, language and social development, they vary on both the reasons 
for and implications of the impairment.  The following section illustrates eight different 
theories about the imitation deficit in individuals with ASD: theory of apraxia-related 
deficit (DeMyer, 1972), information processing theory (Smith & Bryson, 1994), the 
mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretta, 2006), theory 
of mind deficits (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), impairments in social processing, 
orienting, and motivation (Whiten & Brown, 1999; Dawson et al., 2004; Nadel, 2002), 
and the Development Individual-Difference Relationship-Based/Floortime Model’s 
theory of a central nervous system deficit that affects sequencing ability (Greenspan & 
Wieder, 1997). 
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Apraxia-Related Deficit   
The theory of apraxia-related deficit posits that the imitation deficit has a 
neurological foundation, specifically in a disorder called apraxia.  This deficit is 
illustrated by an individual’s inability to perform intentional motor movements in a 
specific order.  Support for this idea is based on the research indicating that children with 
ASD have more difficulty performing multifaceted behaviors as compared with simpler 
ones (DeMyer, 1972).  Additionally, this theory suggests that individuals with autism 
show an imitative impairment because they cannot physically replicate another’s actions 
(DeMyer, 1972).  While this theory may explain a part of the imitation deficit, research 
has reported only a 34% prevalence rate of motor apraxia in children with ASD.  Further, 
research has shown that motor apraxia is more common in younger children, implying 
that the deficit may improve over time and therefore not be seen in older children (Ming, 
Brimacombe, & Wagner, 2007).  The fact that this deficit is not universal and 
additionally disappears over time suggests that motor apraxia does not likely account for 
the broader deficit in imitation in children with ASD.   
Imitation Processing Theory   
The imitation processing theory suggests that the foundation of the imitation 
deficit in ASD is related to an underlying information processing deficit.  This theory 
hypothesizes that individuals with ASD are unable to perceive others’ actions and form 
representations in their minds and are therefore unable to successfully replicate those 
actions.  Similar to the apraxia theory, this theory emphasizes that the imitation deficit 
itself is not inherently a social deficit but rather that the impairment has social side effects 
(Smith & Bryson, 1994).  While cognitive deficits, correlated with information 
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processing impairments, are sometimes present in children with ASD, research has 
reported that they are not seen in most children with ASD, reporting a prevalence rate 
range of 46-62% (Rice, 2009).   Additionally, oral-facial imitation has been shown to 
have a higher degree of impairment in children with ASD than object imitation, 
suggesting a more affective deficit rather than a cognitive one (Rogers, Hepburn, 
Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003).  Therefore, this theory may also account for part of the 
imitation impairment seen in children with ASD, but it does not explain it in full.   
The Mirror Neuron System Theory   
A plethora of neuropsychological research on imitation exists focusing on a 
hypothetical mirror neuron system.  Evidence garnered from research with primates 
indicates that mirror neurons are activated when the primate detects an object-directed 
action.  Found in the cortex of the superior temporal sulcus, it is suggested that mirror 
neurons primarily function as a method to understand the actions of others with an 
additional mediating function of imitation.  The neurons further allow the primate to view 
and understand an action and encode it as information in the brain without having to 
physically perform the action itself.  Additionally, if the action being observed is one that 
the primate has the ability to perform, the primate is more likely to copy that action.  If it 
is not, the observation is encoded for future learning.  In terms of the system’s existence 
in humans, studies show evidence through the activation of the motor cortex when 
humans observe another’s action without that human engaging in any motor activity him- 
or herself.  (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
 Specific research investigating the functioning of the mirror neuron system in 
individuals with ASD has revealed a link between the amount of activity in this neuronal 
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area and symptoms of ASD, with less activity associated with more severe ASD 
characteristics.  Specifically, when engaged in a task that required participants to observe 
and imitate facial expressions, individuals with ASD showed less activation in the mirror 
neuron system than typically developing participants (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).  This 
neuropsychological evidence provides a possible biological basis for the imitation deficit 
found in children with ASD, further supporting the need for interventions to bolster this 
skill in this population.  
Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind is defined as the ability to know and understand what other 
people know, want, feel, and believe (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  This 
construct has been used to explain imitation deficits commonly found in children with 
ASD.  As aforementioned, in order to engage in imitation with another person, one must 
recognize that one is being imitated.  This recognition implies that one must have some 
knowledge of the other person’s intentions, a skill related to theory of mind.  If children 
with ASD lack theory of mind, they may not be able to recognize that another person is 
imitating them and therefore be unable to engage in the reciprocal process. 
The seminal study used to test theory of mind developed the Sally Anne test 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This test presents the scenario of two girls, Sally and Anne.  
Sally puts a marble in a basket and leaves the room; promptly after, Anne removes the 
marble from the basket and places it in a box.  Sally then comes back into the room to 
look for her marble.  Children are then asked where Sally will look for her marble.  To 
show the presence of theory of mind, children should say Sally will look in the basket, as 
in Sally’s mind, that is where it should be since she left it there and is unaware that Anne 
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moved it.  However, if children answer that Sally will look in the box, where it is now, it 
demonstrates that they are unable to see the situation from Sally’s point of view and, 
therefore, lack a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983).   
 A study by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) using the Sally Anne test found 
that 85% of typically developing children and 86% of children with mental retardation 
were able to correctly report that Sally would look in the basket, demonstrating strong 
evidence for theory of mind abilities in the normative population.  However, 80% percent 
of the children with ASD reported that Sally would look in the box, failing the theory of 
mind task.  The authors suggested that children with ASD are often unable to perceive 
and understand other people’s mental states, therefore making imitation of others a 
difficult, if not impossible, task (1985). 
 The proposal of a theory of mind deficit has been supported by many replication 
studies (e.g., Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Charman et al., 1997).  However, no research 
exists that has directly tested the relationship between theory of mind and imitation.  
Therefore, this link remains a theory rather than an evidenced fact. 
Social Processing, Orienting, and Motivation Theories   
An important component in imitation is the ability to recognize human beings as 
intentional actors (Nadel, 2002).  Research has shown that by the age of eighteen months, 
typically developing infants are aware of the intentionality behind people’s behaviors, 
even if the behavior they see someone perform does not realize the intended goal.  
Through the behavioral re-enactment paradigm, research has shown that infants are more 
likely to imitate actions that they perceive to have been premeditated than actions that 
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they perceive to be inadvertent.  Specifically, infants who observed an adult performing 
goal-directed behaviors, whether they were successful or not, imitated these behaviors 75 
percent of the time while infants who either watched no demonstrations or an adult’s 
random behaviors toward objects did not imitate the adult’s behaviors (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1995).  Additionally, infants were six times more likely to imitate an adult’s unsuccessful 
goal-directed behaviors than a machine that performed the same actions as the adult who 
had previously demonstrated successful goal-directed behaviors (Meltzoff, 1995).  This 
research highlights the importance of an infant’s ability to consider both physical and 
psychological components of other people in imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998 in 
Bråten, 1999).   
 Research has also shown that infants are able to detect equivalence between time 
and space in an imitation situation.  In a study involving fourteen-month-old infants, two 
adults sat across a table from each infant.  One adult imitated the infant while the other 
paid attention to the infant, but did not copy his or her actions.  Results showed that the 
infant looked at and smiled at the imitative adult significantly more often than the non-
imitative adult.  Additionally, the infant also made sudden changes in their behavior as if 
to test the adult’s level of imitation.  This additional behavior seen in the infant implies 
that at this age, children understand that they have some power over an imitative situation 
(Meltzoff, 1990).   
These findings raise the question of whether the imitation deficits found in 
children with ASD are due to broader social impairments and more specifically, a deficit 
in social processing.  The functional approach to this subject suggests that the most 
important part of this deficit is not necessarily the lack of imitation ability but rather the 
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inability to recognize when one is being imitated.  This approach posits that children with 
ASD actually develop imitation skills equivalent to those of typically developing children.  
While the majority of research suggests differences in imitation abilities between children 
with ASD and their typically developing counterparts, one study stands in contrast, 
finding that nonverbal children with autism will spontaneously imitate both typically 
developing children and enthusiastic, playful adults (Nadel, 2002).  However, the authors 
assert that imitation does not continue to develop because children with ASD do not view 
humans as social beings.  In other words, children with ASD do not expect humans to 
take part in this social contingency (Nadel, 2002).   
Further evidence for this theory comes from studies that have examined social 
orienting and joint attention in children with ASD.  A social orienting deficit is defined as 
an impairment in being able to spontaneously attend to social stimuli occurring in the 
environment.  Research has demonstrated that children with ASD are less likely to orient 
to both social and nonsocial stimuli but have a particularly acute deficit in attending to 
social stimuli in comparison to children with developmental delays and/or typical 
development.  A related deficit associated with ASD is in joint attention, which is the 
ability to share, attend to, and control the attention of another person.  Similar to the 
findings on social orienting, research has shown that in comparison to children with 
developmental delays and/or typical development, children with ASD are less likely to 
engage another in joint attention as well as react to another’s initiation of joint attention 
(Dawson et al., 2004).   
This explanation is related to the motivation hypothesis, which suggests that 
because individuals with ASD do not necessarily view humans as social beings, they do 
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not have the drive to attempt to engage them in any type of social behaviors, for which 
imitation is a firm foundation.  Additionally, this theory also proposes that imitation is 
not a general deficit in individuals with autism but rather specifically related to its social 
properties.  Studies have shown that children with ASD can imitate when prompted to do 
so (Lovaas, Freitas, Nelson, & Whalen, 1967; Ingersoll, 2007; Ingersoll, 2008).   
Conversely, it has been shown that children with ASD do not spontaneously engage in 
imitation (Whiten & Brown, 1999; Ingersoll, 2008).  This unprompted imitation is the 
type of imitation that is most closely related to social development, therefore suggesting 
that imitation is only impaired in children with ASD as it relates to social purposes 
(Whiten & Brown, 1999).   
Promisingly, research has also shown that following a situation in which an adult 
imitates a child with ASD, the child’s amount of imitation increases.  In  still-face 
paradigm studies (Nadel et al., 2000; Escalona, Field, Nadel, & Lundy, 2002)  an adult 
enters a room in which a child is playing and sits in a chair, away from the child and 
without any emotion on his or her face.  After an allotted amount of time, the adult 
engages the child through imitating the child’s every action and noise for a set length of 
time.  Following this engagement, the adult returns to the chair, void of emotion.  The 
results of these studies have reported children approaching the adult, vocalizing and 
touching them, as if they are exploring the person.  During this phase, when children 
were then prompted to imitate, the number of imitative behaviors they performed was 
significantly greater than during baseline.  It is perhaps this demonstration of the human 
social qualities of others that engages the child with autism in further imitative and social 
interactions.  This paradigm suggests that by the adult imitating the child, the child 
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becomes more likely to engage in further imitation with the adult.  In order to determine 
whether the adult’s engagement of the child by imitating him or her truly affects the 
subsequent predicted increase in the child’s imitation performance, the current study 
implements the first part of this paradigm over several sessions and immediately assesses 
the child’s spontaneous imitation ability after each session. 
Despite the various theories on the source of the imitation deficit, researchers 
agree that this impairment does not exist in a vacuum but rather has an effect on other 
skills common in early childhood development. 
Effects of Imitation Deficit on Development 
Imitation deficits, common in children with ASD, have widespread impact on 
their development.  Specifically, imitation abilities are related to successful mastery of 
receptive and expressive language skills, the ability to learn appropriate social interaction 
skills, and the development of play.  Highlights of specific impacts are described below.   
Language  
As demonstrated by the use of imitation by preverbal infants and its subsequent 
disappearance once functional language has developed, it can be argued that imitation 
plays a crucial part in learning to communicate (Ingersoll & Lalonde, 2010).  Imitation 
provides a basis for learning intentionality in human communication, an important notion 
that allows individuals to engage in a give and take style of connecting (Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).  A lack of imitation skills in children with ASD 
may explain some of the language deficits often shown in individuals with the disorder. 
Imitation – specifically motor imitation – is predictive of the amount of 
expressive language in typically developing children as well as those with ASD (Stone & 
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Yoder, 2001).  Research has shown that the degree of motor imitation in children with 
ASD at two years is a significant indicator of their level of expressive language ability at 
four years, no matter their language abilities prior to two years of age.  As successful 
motor imitation requires an individual to both orient their attention to another person as 
well as create an image of that person’s action in the mind, social information processing 
skills must be present.  Further, the individual must have the motivation to engage with 
another person in the first place.  These two skills must be present for language 
acquisition as well, as children often acquire language by observing and imitating 
individuals in around them (Stone & Yoder, 2001).  Imitation through the body and the 
face has been found to be correlated with language development  (Rogers, Hepburn, 
Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003; Stone, Ousley, & Littleford, 1997); specifically, 
adolescents with ASD who were able to perform upper and lower facial imitation had 
more spontaneous speech than adolescents who could not (Freitag, Kleser, & von 
Gontardf, 2006). 
 Individuals with ASD often struggle with role reversal imitation.  For example, 
children with ASD often have difficulty learning how to wave; when attempting to 
replicate the gesture, children will wave at others with their palms facing themselves 
instead of outward at other people (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005). This deficit 
in role reversal imitation is also reflected in the language of individuals with ASD, often 
characterized by echolalia, personal pronoun errors, and the incorrect use of questions 
versus statements.  For example, a child with ASD may misattribute the question, “How 
are you?” to be related to the asker of the question and reply, “You are happy” (Peeters, 
Grobben, Hendrickx, Van den Eede, & Verlinden, 2003).  Difficulty in role reversal 
	   17	  
imitation reveals a central consequence of the imitation deficit – the inability to correctly 
attribute and act upon the intentions of others.  Additionally, research has shown that 
children with ASD who have better role reversal imitation skills also have better 
language skills (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005).  
Social Interaction and Skills 
 Imitation has been shown to be a precursor and introductory method for social 
interaction.  Therefore, poor imitation skills may contribute to the consistently low 
occurrence of quality peer relationships in young children with ASD (Ingersoll, 2008).  
Studies have shown that at twenty-four months of age, children who are imitated will 
more often continue to engage in a game, create a new game with another person, and 
look at the other person’s face (Eckerman & Stein, 1990).  Additionally, research has 
shown that nonverbal imitation results in a shared understanding of play activities, 
leading to an increase in verbal means of play interactions (Eckerman & Didow, 1996).     
As imitation deficits negatively impact other areas of development, it is important 
that research examine different types of interventions to facilitate the development of 
imitation and its secondary effects.  Various interventions have yielded success in 
promoting the development of imitation skills (e.g., discrete trial training, pivotal 
response training, reciprocal imitation training).  For the purposes of this investigation,  
two such treatments will be reviewed:  discrete trial training, a behaviorally-based 
intervention that focuses solely on direct elicitation of imitation, and Reciprocal Imitation 
Training (RIT), which facilitates not only the direct instruction of imitation but also its 
spontaneous use (Lovaas, 1987; Ingersoll, 2008). 
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Discrete Trial Training 
Discrete trial training is a structured form of direct instruction that uses applied 
behavior analysis principles such as reinforcement, prompting, and shaping successive 
approximations to teach a new behavior.  Discrete trial training occurs over several trials 
until a skill is mastered, each trial consisting of five steps: first, a cue, such as “Time to 
work” or “Look”, is given to signal the child it is time to begin to work.  Second, the 
instructor gives the child a direction; in the case of imitation training, it may be, “Do this”, 
while the instructor performs an action.  Third, the child responds to the instructor’s 
action.  Fourth, the instructor provides a consequence for the child’s action.  If the child 
performs the action correctly, the consequence is a form of positive reinforcement.  If the 
child performs the action incorrectly or does not respond, the instructor will use either 
verbal, gestural or physical prompts until the child completes the action, after which the 
child will receive positive reinforcement.  Finally, the instructor pauses after the 
consequence is given before moving onto the next trial (Lovaas, 1987).  Discrete trial 
training has been used successfully in teaching imitation skills to children with ASD 
(Lovaas, Freitas, Nelson, & Whalen, 1967; Baer, Peterson, & Sherman, 1967; Lovaas, 
Berberich, Perloff, & Schaeffer, 1966).  However, generalization to other forms of 
imitation are rarely seen.  It is hypothesized that this type of training does not result in an 
increase in spontaneous imitation ability (Ingersoll, 2008), but direct tests of the relation 
between this method of intervention and spontaneous imitation skills in children with 
ASD are scant. 
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Reciprocal Imitation Training (RIT) 
Reciprocal Imitation Training (RIT) is an imitation intervention that is based on 
natural social interactions.  The purpose of this method is to teach the child how to use 
imitation to engage in social behaviors while continuously communicating with an adult.  
During the first phase of this method, the adult imitates all of the child’s actions, verbal 
and nonverbal.  This encourages the child to pay attention to the adult, so that in the later 
phase, the child will be more likely to attend to and imitate the adult.  While the adult 
imitates the child, he or she describes the behavior that they are enacting together; this 
addition of language into the method may increase imitation of language in the child.  
Following this phase, the second phase of RIT begins, wherein the adult teaches the child 
how to imitate (Ingersoll, 2008).   
 The teaching phase of RIT has three main goals.  First, the adult wants to make 
the child want to imitate him or her.  This goal is attained by the adult modeling 
behaviors that the child already knows and that make sense to the child in the context of 
play.  The adult also reinforces the child through praise, something that is likely to occur 
in the natural environment outside of treatment.  Second, RIT purports to encourage 
spontaneous imitation.  By describing behaviors rather than commanding the child to 
perform them, the child will imitate behaviors he or she finds interesting and motivating.  
Finally, the imitation extends to other settings and time periods rather than only the 
treatment session.  To accomplish this, the adult focuses on imitation attempts and 
approximations instead of exact productions of a behavior.  Any and every attempt a 
child makes to imitate the adult is provided with verbal reinforcement (Ingersoll, 2008).   
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The second phase of RIT follows a spontaneous, social model of imitation.  
Previous research has shown that the core of the imitation deficit in individuals with ASD 
may be specifically related to its social component.  In a study that compared the 
predictive constructs in relation to the effectiveness of three different imitation treatment 
contexts (direct elicitation, interactive play, and observational learning), results showed 
that in the interactive play condition, social reciprocity was significantly positively 
related to motor imitation skills, even when developmental level was held constant.  
Additionally, this study found that children performed more imitation under the direct 
elicitation condition than the interactive play condition, supporting the idea that core 
imitation deficits lie in its social factor.  However, the interactive play condition did show 
an increase in imitation and possibly targets the most salient deficit and therefore is an 
important part of the treatment (McDuffie, Turner, Stone, Yoder, Wolery, & Ulman, 
2007).   
 Another study by Ingersoll replicated these results with the addition of a control 
group of typically developing children.  Results showed that children with ASD did not 
perform significantly differently than their typically developing peers in the elicited 
imitation condition but they imitated significantly less than the typically developing 
children in the spontaneous imitation condition.  Furthermore, typically developing 
children did not show a significant difference in performance between the elicited and 
spontaneous imitation conditions, suggesting that spontaneous imitation may be 
particularly impaired in children with ASD (2007).   
 Further support of the use of a spontaneous and social imitation condition in 
treatment comes from the Still-Face Paradigm.  This structured session involves four 
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phases, each lasting three minutes.  In the first phase, a strange adult enters the room in 
which the child is playing and sits in a chair without paying any attention to the child or 
showing any emotion.  In the second phase, the adult imitates all of the child’s behaviors, 
both social and object-directed.  The third phase is a replication of the first phase, 
followed by the fourth phase, which is spontaneous interaction between the child and the 
adult.  Results of this procedure showed an increase in child’s attention to the adult 
during both the third and fourth phases.  This increased attention was manifested in 
looking at, smiling at, touching, and vocalizing to the adult.  These attentive behaviors 
were also exhibited significantly more than simple gross motor behaviors.  Additionally, 
an increase in negative emotional behavior, such as frowning at the adult, was shown in 
the third phase during which the adult rescinded the previous attention they had been 
giving the child.  The authors of the study suggest that this increase in attentive behaviors 
may be due to the development of a social expectancy of the adult from the child (Field, 
Field, Sanders, & Nadel, 2001).   
 A follow-up study involving this Still-Face Paradigm compared the differences in 
child responses to imitation versus contingent responding.  As compared to the imitation 
condition, the contingent responding condition involved the adult paying attention to the 
child’s behaviors and responding to them but not initiating interaction through imitation.  
Results indicated that children demonstrated more attentive behaviors toward the adult in 
the imitation condition rather than in the contingent responding condition, as 
demonstrated by a decrease in motor and verbal stereotypies and a greater increase in 
social touching toward the adult in the imitation condition (Escalona, Field, Nadel, & 
Lundy, 2002). 
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 The current study compared the effectiveness of the direct elicitation of imitation 
found in the structure of discrete trial training, a common form of intervention with 
children with autism, with the more naturalistic, albeit less common, child-directed 
imitation intervention found in the Still-Face Paradigm and Reciprocal Imitation Training 
(Lovaas, 1987; Escalona, Field, Nadel, & Lundy, 2002; Ingersoll, 2008). 
Statement of the Problem 
 Imitation is an important skill for human beings to acquire as it provides the basis 
for learning more complex skills, such as communication and social skills.  Typically 
developing children begin to exhibit imitation within the first days of life (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977) and continue to develop a wider repertoire of imitation skills through their 
interactions with people and the environment.  Imitation skills continue to develop 
throughout childhood, and expand to provide the basis for learning language and other 
complex behaviors.  For example, by twelve months of age, children are able to 
understand a behavior as purposeful as well as to imitate a behavior with the same 
intention (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998).  Further, by thirty months of age, 
typically developing children demonstrate knowledge of reciprocal communication 
norms in their imitation abilities, reflecting temporal norms (Nadel, 1986).  While 
typically developing children show this developmental progression in imitation, children 
with ASD do not naturally develop imitation skills. 
 Numerous theories surround the etiology of the lack of imitation ability in 
children with ASD.  These theories focus on constructs ranging from cognitive deficits 
such as a lack of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) to 
neuropsychological impairments in stimuli processing (McPartland et al., 2004; Webb et 
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al., 2003) to a lack of social processing, orienting, and motivation (Whiten & Brown, 
1999; Dawson et al., 2004; Nadel, 2002).  While research has not yet settled on a 
definitive cause for the imitation impairment, studies have demonstrated the effectiveness 
of different interventions to improve imitation abilities in children with ASD. 
 Interventions that have proved to be successful in this area include discrete trial 
training (Lovaas, 1987) and reciprocal imitation training (Ingersoll, 2008).  Discrete trial 
training is a program based in applied behavior analysis that focuses on the operant 
conditioning of new behaviors.  While studies have demonstrated this method’s 
effectiveness in eliciting imitation directly, it has shown less success in the development 
of spontaneous imitation skills (McDuffie et al., 2007).  Reciprocal imitation training 
attempts to provide a supplement to this missing piece, the focus of the intervention being 
to increase imitation in natural social environments.  Reciprocal imitation training adds a 
phase of child-directed imitation, wherein an adult imitates the child’s actions, prior to 
engaging the child in a more teaching-based format of imitation learning (Ingersoll, 
2008).  While previous research has studied the correlations between motor imitation and 
different types of interventions (McDuffie et al., 2007; Ingersoll, 2007), no studies have 
directly assessed the effectiveness of discrete trial training compared with child-directed 
imitation on the spontaneous imitation ability of children with ASD. 
 The current study directly compared the effectiveness of teacher-directed 
imitation (discrete trial training) and child-directed imitation on the development of 
spontaneous imitation skills in children with ASD.  In a multiple baseline across 
participants design, participants’ spontaneous imitation ability was assessed following 
both teacher-directed and child-directed imitation sessions.  Additionally, as research has 
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demonstrated a relationship between imitation and expressive language ability (Stone & 
Yoder, 2001), participants’ expressive language skills were assessed following the 
conclusions of the teacher-directed and child-directed imitation conditions.  As it is 
estimated that only fifty percent of individuals with ASD possess functional language, it 
is important to examine and discover the most effective ways to cultivate this essential 
skill in this population (DeMyer, 1972; Smith, Mirenda, & Zaidman-Zait, 2007).  Based 
on current research on imitation intervention effectiveness as well as the corollaries 
associated with imitation development, three hypotheses were associated with the current 
study. 
 It was hypothesized that discrete trial training would produce a slight increase in 
spontaneous imitation ability.  It was further hypothesized that much greater spontaneous 
imitation gains would be evidenced during the child-directed imitation condition of the 
study.  Finally, it was hypothesized that participants would show an increase in 
expressive language over the course of the study. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Method 
Participants 
 In the current study, three participants with a medical or educational diagnosis of 
autism were recruited for participation through a Midwestern autism services clinic. 
Exclusionary criteria included having sufficient imitation skills prior to the study, defined 
as scoring 75% or higher on the spontaneous imitation screening assessment, described 
below; or having insufficient motor skill ability to complete the imitation tasks.  Specific 
characteristics of each participant are described below.   
 The first participant, Daisy, is a Caucasian female diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD).  She was three years, six months old at the beginning of the 
study.  Daisy’s score on the ADOS-2 reflected a diagnosis of autism and she scored 5% 
on the spontaneous imitation screening assessment.  
 The second participant, Patrick, is a Caucasian male diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder.  He was four years, 2 months old at the beginning of the study.  
Patrick’s score on the ADOS-2 reflected a diagnosis of falling on the autism spectrum.  
His initial score on the spontaneous imitation assessment was 50%. 
 The third participant, John, is an African male diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorder.  He was 4 years, 7 months old at the beginning of the study.  John’s score on the 
ADOS-2 reflected a diagnosis of autism.  His initial score on the spontaneous imitation 
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assessment was 10%.   
Setting 
 All experimental sessions were conducted in a room measuring approximately 15 
by 15 feet.  The room was equipped with a child-sized table, two chairs, and 10 sets of 
identical pairs of objects.   
Measures 
 Pre-assessment imitation battery. This assessment measures a child’s 
spontaneous imitation of adults.  Tasks on this assessment were drawn from a modified 
version of the Unstructured Imitation Assessment (UIA; adapted from McDuffie et al., 
2007 cited in Ingersoll, 2010).  During this assessment, the evaluator attempts to engage 
the child in imitation in an indirect method.  The experimenter performs actions and call 
attention to those actions by describing to the child what she is doing.  For example, the 
experimenter may place a hat on her head while saying, “I am putting a hat on my head”.  
Previous research has demonstrated moderate internal consistency for this measure (α 
= .66) (Ingersoll, 2010).  Please see Table 1 for specific tasks that were used during this 
pre-assessment screening measure.    
Participants’ responses on spontaneous imitation tasks were coded on a three-
point scale with a 0-2 range, a score of “0” representing a failure to imitate, a score of “1” 
representing an attempted but not complete imitation, and a score of “2” representing a 
complete imitation (Ingersoll, 2008).  Details of the coding system are provided below.    
A score of “2” indicated that the child did complete movement that the 
experimenter performed. This involved a very close typography to the action performed 
by the experimenter, but the number of times the action was performed and the intensity 
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with which it was performed could be different.  For example, the adult may have 
clapped her hands three times while the child clapped his or her hands only once. 
A score of “1” indicated that the child did a close approximation of the movement 
performed by the experimenter. The movement could be a loose approximation of the 
action performed by the teacher.  For example, the experimenter may have wrapped a boa 
around her neck, but the child may have only laid the boa across his or her shoulders – an 
emerging response. 
A score of “0” indicated that the child did not attempt to imitate the 
movement/action of the experimenter, or the child engaged in some alternate behavior 
with the object (or any other object in the room).  
Table 1.  
Pre-assessment Tasks: The Unstructured Imitation Assessment (UIA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Object Motor 
Place ball on 
head 
Wave hand 
Roll ball 
 
Clap hands 
Move toy car 
back and forth  
Put fingers on 
lips 
“Jump” frog 
 
Open close fist 
Bang two cubes 
together 
Squint 
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Spontaneous imitation assessment.  The spontaneous imitation assessment 
consisted of ten trials each day where participants had the opportunity to imitate motor 
behaviors with and without objects.  During this assessment, the experimenter attempted 
to engage the child in imitation in an indirect method.  Specifically, the experimenter 
performed actions and called attention to those actions by describing to the child what she 
was doing.  For example, the experimenter may have placed a hat on her head while 
saying, “I am putting a hat on my head”.  Two verbal prompts were provided for each 
task, but no physical prompts were given for any task, no matter the response from the 
participant.  During this assessment, participants received verbal feedback.  If the 
participant performed a full imitation, the researcher said, “We’re doing the same thing!”  
If the participant performed only a partial imitation or no imitation at all, the researcher 
described something else that the participant was doing (e.g., “You’re rolling the ball!”).  
A total of ten tasks, five object imitation and five motor imitation, were randomly 
selected out of forty tasks for each assessment session using a random number generator.  
By having forty possible tasks from which to choose as well as randomly choosing them 
for each session of each phase, the likelihood that any participant learned any specific 
tasks and therefore compromised the validity of the treatment interventions’ effectiveness 
was greatly decreased.  These tasks were adapted from those used in prior research 
(McDuffie et al., 2007; Ingersoll, 2007).  Table 2 contains the complete list of tasks.   
Table 2.  
Imitation Training and Assessment Tasks 
OBJECT MOTOR 
1. Clap spoons 1. Raise hand 
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2. Roll car 2. Clap hands 
3. Place umbrella over head 3. Thumbs up 
4. Bounce ball 4. Wave hand 
5. Put pacifier in doll’s mouth 5. Put hand on wall 
6. Clap kaleidoscopes 6. Nod head 
7. Swing boa 7. Shake head  
8. Hold cup to doll’s mouth 8. Point at window 
9. Put spoon in box 9. Put hand on cheek 
10. Put blanket on doll 10. Put hand on nose 
11. Hold kaleidoscope to eye 11. Put hand on head 
12. Rock baby doll 12. Make fist 
13. Roll ball  13. Put hand on shoulder 
14. Put ball in box 14. Put hand on elbow 
15. Shake kaleidoscope 15. Put hand on table 
16. Stack bowls 16. Tap table  
17. Pretend to eat out of bowl with spoon 17. Put hand on neck 
18. Stack plates 18. Put hand on mouth 
19. Pretend to drink out of cup 19. Put hand over eye 
20. Stack boxes 20. Put hand over ear 
  
Spontaneous imitation assessments were conducted during each session across each 
condition and served as the primary dependent variable.    
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Expressive language.  Participants were presented with a set of picture 
cards.  The experimenter held up one card at a time and oriented the participant to the 
card with a verbal prompt of, “Look!”  Once the experimenter had the participant’s 
attention, the experimenter asked, “What is this?” The experimenter did not give any 
feedback to the participant following his or her answer.  This assessment was conducted 
at the end of each phase.  Scores on this assessment were based on the complexity of 
language the participant used to answer the question “What is this?” when presented with 
each picture.  Participants received one point for each component of the picture he or she 
verbally described.   For example, if a participant simply said, “car” when shown a 
picture of a car, he or she received one point.  If a participant said, “Big, red car” he or 
she received three points. A total of ten picture cards were be used and randomly ordered 
for each assessment session using a random number generator.   
Design 
Treatment was implemented in a noncontingent multiple-baseline across 
participants design.  The dependent measure was performance on spontaneous imitation 
trials.  All participants began at baseline.  The baseline session consisted of a set of ten 
trials of spontaneous imitation (described in detail below).  Baseline sessions were 
repeated until the participant showed a stable level of responding, as defined by at least 
three consecutive data points that were determined to be stable or to show a decreasing 
trend as is consistent with the conventions of single-subject design.   
Once stable baseline performance is achieved for the participant, he or she began 
condition one.  After stable performance was demonstrated in condition one, he or she 
began condition two. 
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Each participant was exposed to each condition following the rules of a 
noncontingent multiple-baseline design across participants. In order to measure the 
impact of intervention on expressive language skills, one probe was conducted at the end 
of each phase. 
Data Collection and Reliability 
All sessions in each condition (baseline, teacher-directed imitation, child-
direction) were coded by viewing videotapes.  A researcher who did not conduct the 
session being scored served as the coder.  Twenty-five percent of participants’ data were 
coded by two independent observers in order to calculate inter-observer agreement. Inter-
observer agreement was calculated by dividing the number of agreements by the sum of 
agreements and disagreements. 
Procedure 
Recruitment. Members of a local parent support group for children with ASD 
were contacted in person to request participation in the current study.  Parents were 
provided with a detailed written and verbal explanation of the study and had the 
opportunity to give consent for their child to participate in the study.  Formal assent was 
not be obtained from the children, due to their limited language capabilities, but the 
researchers asked the parents to describe how to know if a child was willing to cooperate 
in activities and looked for behavioral signs that may indicate non-participation interest 
(e.g., crying, attempting to leave the room) in the children.  
Assessment of imitation skills.  In order to determine spontaneous imitation 
skills prior to intervention, each participant was screened through a pre-training imitation 
assessment.   Ten trials, five object imitation and five motor imitation, were conducted.  
	   32	  
Each participant received the same ten tasks that are presented in Table 1.  Imitation 
performance was coded on a scale of 0-2 following the procedures described above.  
Participants who scored fourteen points or lower, or less than 75%, qualified for the study.  
Intervention.  Each experimental session took place in a room that contained a 
diverse assortment of toys, including some toys in identical pairs.  Each session was 
divided in three parts: object imitation, motor imitation, and spontaneous imitation 
assessment. Each intervention phase consisted of ten trials of imitation training tasks and 
ten trials of spontaneous imitation assessment, each randomly chosen from the tasks 
listed in Table 2.  These intervention sessions occurred two to three times per week.  
There were three conditions of intervention:  baseline, teacher-directed intervention, and 
child-directed intervention.  Details of each phase are described below.   
 Baseline. All participants began in baseline to determine the level of spontaneous 
imitation prior to the implementation of the two treatment conditions.  During baseline 
sessions, ten randomly selected spontaneous imitation assessment tasks were conducted 
with each participant.  These tasks were chosen from the list of tasks in Table 2, with a 
total of five object and five motor imitation tasks for each baseline session.  No feedback 
or prompting in reference to the participants’ imitation performance was given.  However, 
the child was provided with reinforcement for appropriate task behaviors or maintenance 
behaviors (ones they have already learned and can easily demonstrate) approximately ten 
times each session, to keep the rate of reinforcement consistent between baseline and 
treatment conditions.   
Condition one: Teacher-directed imitation.  Teacher-directed imitation consisted 
of 10 training trials (5 object and 5 motor) using discrete trial training, followed by 10 
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opportunities for spontaneous imitation (dependent variable in this study).  Specifically, 
during this condition, the experimenter and child were either seated across the table from 
one another as is traditionally done in this type of imitation training, or worked on the 
floor, depending on the child’s attention capabilities (Lovaas, 1987; Maurice, Green, & 
Luce, 1996). In the object imitation portion of the battery, the experimenter then chose a 
toy that had an identical pair that the child had not been playing with, got the child’s 
attention with the verbal command “look at me”, and then modeled a developmentally 
appropriate action with the toy accompanied by the verbal prompt “Do this”.  The 
experimenter then looked at the child and waited for them to imitate the action for five 
seconds.  If the child responded correctly, their imitation behavior was reinforced and the 
trial was over.  If the child responded incorrectly, the experimenter provided prompts to 
elicit the correct response.  The trial was over when the child performed the correct 
response.  In the motor imitation part of the battery, the experimenter followed an 
identical procedure to the object imitation portion with the exception of modeling actions 
that did not involve any items.  For example, during one task, the experimenter said, “Do 
this”, and then waved her hand.  The tasks for this phase were drawn from the list in 
Table 2 and were randomly generated each session to provide five object and five motor 
imitation tasks.  During the teacher-directed imitation condition, all props used for the 
imitation tasks were in front of and accessible to the child.   
 Following the completion of the ten trials of imitation training tasks, participants 
were assessed on ten spontaneous imitation tasks.  These tasks were chosen from the list 
of tasks in Table 2, with a total of five object and five motor imitation tasks for each 
assessment.  Just as during baseline, no feedback or prompting related to the participants’ 
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imitation performance was given.  However, the researcher reinforced the child for 
appropriate task behaviors or behaviors that he or she already had learned approximately 
ten times each session.   
 Condition two: Child-directed imitation.  This condition was directly modeled 
after both the Still-Face Paradigm and RIT.  This condition differed from the teacher-
directed condition in that the participant guided all interactions.  During this phase, the 
adult imitated any and all of the child’s actions for a period of five minutes 
(approximately the same amount of time it took to complete 10 discrete trial training 
tasks).  For example, if the child rolled a car back and forth across the table, the 
experimenter rolled a car back and forth across the table.  If the child flapped their hands, 
the experimenter flapped their own hands.  
 Following the five minutes of child-directed imitation, the participant received ten 
trials of spontaneous imitation assessment tasks.  The procedure was identical to the 
description in both baseline and condition one. 
Research Team Training and Treatment Integrity 
 The research team for the current study was comprised of four graduate students 
in school psychology and five undergraduate students.  The research assistants who 
implemented the interventions received individual training in discrete trial training to 
teach imitation, reciprocal imitation training, and the expressive language assessment.  
First, demonstrations of each type of assessment and intervention were provided, with 
opportunity for questions.  Following the demonstrations, research assistants practiced 
each intervention and assessment with a partner and received live feedback on their 
performance.  Research assistants who coded videos of the participants’ interventions and 
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assessments received training in the form of instruction on the coding procedure as well 
as opportunities to practice coding videos with immediate feedback and discussion of 
ratings.  Research assistants were required to meet a criterion of 90% accuracy in their 
coding. Inter-observer reliability was calculated for twenty-five percent of the videos.  
This percentage was calculated by the number of agreements divided by the number of 
agreements plus disagreements and then multiplied by 100.  The mean overall inter-
observer reliability was 89.33%, with a range of 33%-100%.     
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 The results are organized as follows: First, baseline data on all participants’ 
spontaneous imitation and expressive language skills are summarized and presented in 
order to describe those skills prior to intervention implementation.  Second, single-
subject design data is presented and each research question is discussed. 
Baseline Data 
 Prior to each participant’s participation in intervention, baseline assessments in 
spontaneous imitation ability and expressive language skills were conducted.  No 
participants met the exclusionary criteria of a score of 15 (75%) in spontaneous imitation 
prior to the beginning of intervention.  However, participants did demonstrate differences 
in terms of their spontaneous imitation skills at the start of the study.  Similar differences 
were also observed in terms of expressive language skills.     
 Individual data for each of the three participants is presented. 
Table 3 
Baseline Spontaneous Imitation Results 
Name Min. Max. M(SD) 
Daisy 0 5 1.56(2.46) 
Patrick 1 14 6.86(3.80) 
John 0 4 2.71(1.99) 
  Note. Scores represent number of spontaneous imitations. 
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Table 4 
Baseline Expressive Language Results 
Name Number of Words 
Daisy 0 
Patrick 13 
John 0 
Note. Scores represent number of words spoken. 
Hypothesis One 
 The first hypothesis of the current study was that participants would show an 
increase in spontaneous imitation as well as expressive language skills following a 
discrete trial intervention in imitation.  In order to examine this question, individual 
baseline, intervention and assessment data were graphed, as presented in Figure 1, the x-
axis representing the order of sessions and the y-axis representing the total number of 
spontaneous imitations performed during each session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   38	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  All participants: Spontaneous imitation and expressive language 
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 Between the baseline and first condition, only one of three participants evidenced 
change in spontaneous imitation that could be attributable to the intervention.  
Specifically, Patrick, demonstrated a positive change in trend and level with 71% of the 
data points between these conditions being non-overlapping.  In contrast, neither Daisy 
nor John evidenced change in trend or level in spontaneous imitation with only 5% and 
10% of non-overlapping data points for Daisy and John, respectively. 
 In order to provide a context for interpreting the spontaneous imitation data, Table 
5 summarizes discrete trial training performance for each participant, and the specific 
discrete trial data for each participant are presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4.    
Table 5 
Discrete Trial Training Results 
Name Number of sessions Mastery session 
Daisy 20 10 
Patrick 7 1 
John 20 11 
 
 Figure 2 represents discrete trial training data for Daisy, with the x-axis depicting 
sessions and the y-axis depicting percentage correct.  At the beginning of the discrete trial 
imitation intervention, Daisy demonstrated a relatively low percentage of accuracy in 
terms of elicited imitation, showing a range of 5% of 40% correct.  On the tenth session, 
Daisy demonstrated a large increase in this skill, achieving 80% correct.  Following this 
gain, she showed a variable performance, primarily achieving above 50%.   Changes in 
discrete trial training performance were not mirrored in the spontaneous imitation 
assessments (see Figure 1 for details).   
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Figure 2. Daisy: Discrete trial training in imitation 
 Figure 3 represents discrete trial training data for Patrick, with the x-axis 
depicting sessions and the y-axis depicting percentage correct Patrick demonstrated 
strong skills in elicited imitation from the start of the intervention.  He showed a range of 
75% to 100% independence in during discrete trial training in this skill.   Following two 
days of discrete trial training intervention, Patrick’s spontaneous imitation assessments 
improved to mastery levels. (see Figure 1 for details).   
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Figure 3. Patrick: Discrete trial training in imitation 
 Figure 4 represents discrete trial training data for John, with the x-axis depicting 
sessions and the y-axis depicting percentage correct John possessed a low level of skill in 
elicited imitation at the beginning of the intervention.  He reached his highest 
performance in the skill at session 11, but failed to reach mastery criterion of 80% over 
the course of twenty sessions.  However, due to IRB limitations of twenty sessions per 
condition, the researchers could not continue to implement this intervention.  Following 
this high point, John showed variable performance in elicited imitation, primarily 
remaining below a median of 50% independence.  No changes were noted in John’s 
spontaneous imitation during this condition (see Figure 1 for details). 
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Figure 4. John: Discrete trial training in imitation 
Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis was that participants would show a greater increase in 
spontaneous imitation following a child-directed intervention compared to their 
spontaneous imitation following a discrete trial intervention in imitation.  This hypothesis 
was examined by comparing individual performance on the spontaneous imitation 
assessment to both baseline performance and to performance in condition one. This data 
is depicted in Figure 1, with the x-axis representing the order of sessions and the y-axis 
representing the total number of spontaneous imitations performed during each child-
directed session. 
Between the baseline and second conditions, one participant demonstrated a 
change in spontaneous imitation while the other two participants evidenced either no 
change or skill maintenance.  In particular, 70% of John’s data points between baseline 
and condition two were nonoverlapping with evidence for a positive trend; between 
condition one and condition two, 45% of his data points were nonoverlapping, with a 
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similar positive trend between the two conditions.  For Patrick, 75% of the data points 
between baseline and condition two were nonoverlapping, exhibiting a positive trend.  
However, comparing across conditions, it appeared as if the spontaneous imitation 
condition was helpful in maintaining his high level of performance in condition one, but 
did not improve upon it.  That is, there was a stable level of performance between 
condition one and two with 0% of non-overlapping data points.  0% of Daisy’s data 
points were nonoverlapping with no trend evident in the data; these findings were 
identical to her data between the first and second conditions.   
Hypothesis Three 
 The final hypothesis stated that participants would demonstrate gains in 
expressive language skills over the course of the study.  Expressive language skills were 
probed at the end of baseline, and the end of each intervention condition.    Expressive 
language probes are depicted in Figure 1 and are single data points at the end of each 
condition.   
 Table 6 summarizes expressive language performance across baseline, teacher-
directed imitation training, and child-directed imitation training. 
Table 6. 
Overall Expressive Language Results 
Name Baseline Teacher-Directed Child-Directed 
Daisy 0 6 12 
Patrick 13 14 12 
John 0 1 8 
Note. Scores represent number of words spoken. 
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 Over the course of the study, two of the three participants demonstrated gains in 
expressive language, with one participant demonstrating increases after the teacher-
directed intervention and two showing increases following the child-directed intervention.  
Specifically, Daisy demonstrated increases in expressive language following both types 
of intervention, going from zero words at baseline to six words following condition one,, 
to 12 words following condition two, child-directed imitation training.   
 John, who was just beginning to demonstrate verbal skills at the beginning of the 
study, spoke no words in response to the expressive language probe at baseline.  When 
probed after completion of the first condition, John demonstrated a minor increase with a 
score of 1.  However, following the second condition, John showed a relatively large 
increase on the expressive language probe, speaking a total of eight words.   
In contrast, Patrick’s level of expressive language remained virtually unchanged 
throughout the study.  During the baseline expressive language probe, Patrick provided 
primarily one-word descriptors of each of the picture cards shown to him, speaking a 
total of 13 words.  Following the first condition, teacher-directed imitation training, 
Patrick spoke a total of 14 words on the expressive language probe, and, on the probe 
following condition two, Patrick demonstrated a slight decrease, speaking 12 words.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION 
Due to the crucial role of imitation in early development, especially in terms of 
language and social skill development, research examining interventions that have the 
potential to improve imitation skills in children with ASD are critical.  The current study 
provides data on the effectiveness of two imitation interventions (teacher-directed and 
child-directed) on improving spontaneous imitation skills and expressive language skills 
in children with ASD.  Four main findings can be gleaned from the data.     
First, data indicate that teacher-directed imitation training in the form of discrete 
trial training is effective in improving spontaneous imitation for some children with ASD, 
but not all.  Specifically, in this investigation, one participant demonstrated significant 
gains in spontaneous imitation during the teacher-directed imitation training condition.  
In contrast, the two other participants did not demonstrate significant change in 
performance during this condition.   Similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to the 
effects child-directed imitation training on spontaneous imitation.  That is, in this study 
one child demonstrated increases in spontaneous imitation following child-directed 
imitation training, but the other two children did not. Taken together, it is evident that no 
one intervention proved to be effective across the three participants in improving their 
spontaneous imitation skills.   However, both interventions positively impacted 
expressive language development, as increases in expressive language skills were noted
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after both the teacher-directed and the child-directed interventions in two out of three of 
the children.   
Whereas other studies have shown effectiveness of both interventions, data from 
the current study do not consistently show benefits of either one.  Previous studies 
examining the effectiveness of child-directed imitation training suggest that this method 
results in increases in spontaneous imitation in children with ASD (Ingersoll & 
Schreibman, 2010; Ingersoll, 2008).  Differences in methodology between previous 
research and the current study may in part explain these different findings.  First, one 
study which resulted in increases in spontaneous imitation for the participants after child-
directed imitation training used familiar toys when engaging in imitation with 
participants (Ingersoll & Schreibman, 2010) whereas the current study used more 
standardized, unfamiliar toys.  Had the participants in the current study been allowed to 
interact with objects that they found familiar or reinforcing, they have may demonstrated 
a higher amount of imitative behaviors.  Another methodological difference was the 
amount and intensity of training participants received during the intervention.  For 
example, children receiving intervention one hour per day, three days a week, for ten 
consecutive weeks demonstrated gains in spontaneous imitation (Ingersoll, 2010), 
whereas participants in this study received approximately 10-15 minutes per day, two to 
three days per week over the course of 16 weeks.  Due to the fact that this study was 
conducted over the course of a typical preschool day, the timing of intervention 
implementation was sometimes dependent on factors outside of the research, such as 
school closings and illnesses.  While with basic research it is possible to control the 
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majority such outside factors, applied research requires a higher degree of flexibility, as 
evidenced in the variability of the intervention.  
Another possible explanation for the lack of consistent spontaneous imitation 
following either intervention may be related to the participants’ levels of joint attention.  
Studies have suggested that attention, and more specifically joint attention, may serve as 
a precursor skill to imitation (Dawson, Toth, Abbott, Osterling, Munson, Estes, & Liaw, 
2004).  Joint attention has been linked to the general ability of social orienting, a 
relationship that is only evident in terms of the ability to attend to social stimuli, but not 
to nonsocial stimuli.  This suggests that perhaps the joint attention deficit is especially 
evident when social cues are involved, therefore explaining why children do not attend to 
and then copy the social cues needed for imitation (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, 
& Brown, 1998).  As one of the primary needs in the social act of imitation is the 
recognition that one is being imitated, it may be that participants in the current study did 
not possess sufficient attention skills to recognize they were being imitated (Nadel, 2002).  
Further, while the experimenter prompted participants to attend to stimuli (i.e., the verbal 
prompt, “Look at me”), this may not have served as a strong enough manipulation in 
terms of increasing attention overall.  Finally, at no point during the spontaneous 
imitation assessment were participants prompted to attend to the researcher. 
Further support for the notion that joint attention may have mitigated the effects 
of the imitation interventions is found in the ADOS-2 data for the participants.  There 
appears to be a clear relationship between the participants’ scores on the ADOS-2 and 
their responses to the imitation interventions. The ADOS-2 provides specific scores for 
behaviors related to joint attention, including Response to Name, Spontaneous Initiation 
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of Joint Attention, and Response to Joint Attention.  In the Response to Name subtest, the 
examiner calls the child’s name up to six times to see if the child turns his or her head as 
a response.  On the subtest Spontaneous Initiation of Joint Attention, the examiner rates 
the quantity and quality of the child’s attempts to gain the examiner’s attention.  Finally, 
for Response to Joint Attention, the examiner attempts to gain the child’s attention with a 
verbal prompt of “Look” followed by a point and then the activation of a noisy toy if the 
child does not respond initially (Lord, Rutter, Dilavore, Risi, Gotham, & Bishop, 2012).  
Daisy, whose imitation data did not improve significantly during either 
intervention, had scores on all three of these tasks indicated a low level of social attention.  
Specifically, during the assessment, Daisy did not respond to the calling of her name after 
six presses by the examiner, did not engage in any type of initiation of joint attention, and 
did not follow the examiner’s gaze or point toward an object in the room, indicating no 
response to joint attention.  Similarly, John, who demonstrated more gains during the 
child-directed than the teacher-directed condition, did not respond to his name during the 
assessment, nor did he respond to a verbal prompt to call his attention to the examiner.  
He also did not engage in spontaneous initiation of joint attention and did not follow the 
examiner’s gaze toward an object, but he did look toward the object when the examiner 
pointed at it, suggesting somewhat better joint attention skills.  In contrast to both Daisy 
and Patrick, John, who made the largest gains in spontaneous imitation in the teacher-
directed condition and maintained those gains in the child-directed condition, 
demonstrated stronger attention skills on the assessment.  While he did not spontaneously 
attempt to engage the examiner in joint attention, he responded immediately to his name 
when the examiner said it and followed the examiner’s gaze toward an object in the room 
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on his first try.  Due to evidence provided by previous research on the importance of 
recognizing that one is being imitated, participants’ differing levels of attention (Nadel & 
Fontaine, 1989) – and more specifically, joint attention – may have contributed to their 
varying levels of performance on the spontaneous imitation assessment.  
Additional evidence for differences in participants’ joint attention skills prior to 
the start of the current study can be found in behavioral observations made from the 
video recorded sessions.  Observed social behaviors – including joint attention, eye 
contact, and shared affect – were more frequent with concurrent increases in spontaneous 
imitation.  Behavioral observations of both intervention and assessment show Patrick’s 
high level of attention to the examiner during the teacher-directed imitation condition, 
through eye contact and orientation to the examiner in general, which may have 
explained the subsequent gains in spontaneous imitation.  In fact, during the child-
directed condition of the study, video recordings show Patrick verbally requesting the 
experimenter to do what he was doing (e.g., “You swing boa!”) during the assessment 
portion of the section condition.  He also frequently told the experimenter that they were 
“doing same thing!” before the experimenter provided him with any feedback on his 
actions; additionally, this comment by Patrick was often offered with positive tone, 
suggesting shared enjoyment in the imitation activity.  This awareness of being imitated 
likely impacted his performance on spontaneous imitation, and possibly also his 
enjoyment, therefore further implying the importance of joint attention in the context of 
imitation.  In other words, due to Patrick’s increase attention to the adult in the room, he 
may have been more likely to imitate that adult’s actions. 
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Behavioral observations of John during the child-directed imitation condition 
indicate similar demonstrable changes in engagement, attention, and verbal behavior 
during the child-directed imitation training condition.  During the five minutes of being 
imitated by the experimenter, John often watched the experimenter, giggled at her 
behaviors, and specifically, tried to remove his bowl of popcorn from the vicinity of the 
experimenter, as to imitate him, she was often eating it.  This attempt to hide his snack 
from the experimenter evidences his attention and awareness of the experimenter’s 
actions.  During spontaneous imitation assessments, John was observed to make more eye 
contact with the experimenter, stay focused on the task at hand (i.e., remaining close to 
the experimenter during the tasks rather than running around the room), and repeat more 
of the experimenter’s descriptions of her actions.     
In contrast to behavioral observations of Patrick during both conditions and John 
during the child-directed condition, Daisy was observed to rarely look in the direction of 
the experimenter and would move back and forth across the room frequently without 
attention to the examiner’s actions.  Additionally, she often became fixated on activities 
such as spinning in circles and looking out the window.  Due to this lack of attention, it is 
likely that Daisy was unaware of the experimenter’s actions and therefore did not imitate 
them. Taken together, behavioral as well as quantitative assessment data indicated that 
there may have been pre-experimental differences in joint attention skills across the 
participants, which may have had implications in their spontaneous imitation 
performances during both teacher-directed and child-directed conditions. 
A second possible explanation for individual differences observed in responses to 
the intervention is related to the severity of autism characteristics displayed by the 
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participants.  Data from the ADOS-2 which measures the severity of various 
symptomatology associated with autism (Lord, Rutter, Dilavore, Risi, Gotham, & Bishop, 
2012, indicated differences in levels of ASD severity among the three participants.  
Patrick, who demonstrated more gains in spontaneous imitation as well as maintenance of 
those gains in comparison to Daisy and John, also exhibited fewer autism characteristics.  
Specifically, Patrick’s score was 10 reflecting a diagnosis of being on the autism 
spectrum, while both Daisy’s and John’s scores of 20 and 19, respectively, indicated 
diagnoses of autism, suggesting that the latter two participants’ symptomology was more 
severe.  It is possible that Patrick’s stronger performance was somewhat related to his 
generally higher functioning (Eikeseth, Smith, Jahr,,& Eldevik, 2002).  Previous research 
has demonstrated the relationship between severity of autism symptoms and 
responsiveness to early intervention treatment.  Specifically, research examining the 
effects of early and intensive behavioral interventions for young children with ASD has 
demonstrated that children demonstrating higher intellectual functioning as well as fewer 
deficits in social behaviors tend to demonstrate larger gains in areas such as receptive and 
expressive language as well as play skills (Ben-Itzchak & Zachor, 2007).  
 Overall, the finding that neither intervention seemed to be effective for all 
participants suggests that the aforementioned individual differences in joint attention and 
ASD symptom severity my have served as significant contributors to participants’ 
changes, or lack thereof, in spontaneous imitation skills.  It has been well-established that 
ASD is not a homogeneous disorder but rather an extremely heterogeneous one, as 
reflected in the newly-established diagnostic criteria for the disorder, with functioning 
levels now being included in the overall diagnosis (APA, 2014).  The results of the 
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current study indicate that future research in imitation in children with ASD take into 
consideration how these individual differences may play a part in response to 
interventions. 
 Despite the lack of impact of the interventions on children’s spontaneous 
imitation skills, results did indicate increases in expressive language skills for two out of 
three of the participants following both interventions with the largest increases occurring 
after implementation of child-directed imitation training.  While previous research has 
found that children with stronger skills in imitation are more likely to have better 
expressive language skills (e.g., Freitag, Kleser, & von Gontardf, 2005; Stone & Yoder, 
2001), the participant who made the most gains in imitation – Patrick – demonstrated the 
least gains in expressive language.  One explanation for this finding may be the fact that 
Patrick began the study with a relatively high level of language in comparison to Daisy 
and John.  Both Daisy and John spoke no words in on the baseline probe for expressive 
language, while Patrick spoke a total of thirteen words.    
 It is important to note that previous studies examining expressive language 
development in children with ASD as well as how those skills related to their imitation 
skills used more extensive measures than the one used in the current study.  For example, 
one study examined both parental report and direct observation through three different 
standardized measures in order to assess children’s expressive language skills (Stone & 
Yoder, 2001).  These more extensive instruments likely provided more complex 
information than this study’s picture card method; had the same measures been employed 
in this study, these more sensitive measures may have found more similar results to 
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previous research.  This difference in methodologies may explain the discrepancy 
between the current study’s findings in expressive language and previous literature. 
In addition to pre-treatment individual differences, there may be other variables at 
play in expressive language development.  One such hypothesis is the increase in the 
amount of verbal language the children were exposed to by this point in the study.  The 
participants had heard many phrases repeated over the course of numerous months (e.g., 
“We’re doing the same thing!”, “I’m rolling the ball!”).  Due to children with ASD’s 
preference of routine, this predictable language exposure may have made them more 
likely to pick up on what was being said (APA, 2014). 
 However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the expressive language 
assessment that was administered to the participants did not require them to use language 
they had heard the experimenters speak but rather identify unrelated objects (i.e., dog, cat, 
shoes).  Therefore, experimenters were not teaching participants vocabulary such as 
“dog”, “cat”, or “shoes”, which would have assisted them in completing the expressive 
language assessment.  Rather, experimenters were describing actions both that they were 
doing as well as that the participants were doing.  Had participants been required to 
identify objects used during the imitation training trials, they may have demonstrated an 
even larger increase in expressive language due to more familiarity with that specific 
language.  It is also likely that the interventions the participants were receiving 
concurrently through the early intervention program played a part in the participants’ 
expressive language skill development.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
While the current study offers new information on imitation skill development in 
children with ASD indicating that children have individual differences in their response 
to different imitation interventions, the data collected do not allow us to make 
conclusions about which children would benefit from teacher-directed versus child-
directed interventions. Future research should examine the effects of attention and, more 
specifically, joint attention on imitation.  It has been well established that children with 
ASD often display deficits in joint attention (Osterling & Dawson, 1994; Osterling, 
Dawson, & Munson, 2002).  Research has also examined the developmental trajectories 
of social skill development in children with ASD, results of which have suggested that 
joint attention may not only be related to imitation but may in fact serve as a precursor 
skill (Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2002; Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & 
Brown, 1998; Dawson et al., 2004).  Due to not only the broad impairment in joint 
attention, but also to studies that have shown children with ASD’s lower levels of 
attention to social stimuli in particular, a hypothesis that children with more intact joint 
attention skills would perform better on spontaneous imitation tasks is one worth 
investigating (Dawson et al., 2004).  Additionally, research should examine the role that 
functioning level plays in the effectiveness of imitation interventions. Future research 
should aim to investigate the effects of these two interventions on a larger scale.  
 Another limitation of the study was related to the applied nature of the 
intervention, which resulted in children’s participation to vary in terms of intensity.  That 
is, the interventions were conducted during the participants’ regular early intervention 
program, and thus, their participation in sessions on any given day was dependent on 
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their attendance in the program.  Due to participant illnesses along with weather-related 
closings and scheduled closings due to seasonal holidays, the intervention 
implementation was less consistent than may be ideal.  As research in early intervention 
for children with ASD has suggested better outcomes when more intensive services are 
provided, more positive results may have been evidenced if the intervention would have 
been provided on a more structured, regular schedule (Eikeseth, Smith, Jahr, & Eldevik, 
2007).  Future research in this area should investigate ways to implement the 
interventions in a more structured, consistent manner, such as conducting interventions 
separately from other treatment schedules as well as increasing the frequency of 
intervention delivery during the week to complete it in a shorter period of time, thereby 
possibly avoiding holidays and other availability concerns.  Additionally, future research 
should compare different levels of intensity of intervention in order to identify what is 
necessary and sufficient to make gains.    
Because the interventions were given to all participants in the same order, rather 
than being counter-balanced, the potential benefits of the spontaneous imitation 
intervention may have been compromised.  Due to the fact that discrete trial training is, 
by nature, a structured, routine intervention, it is possible that the participants became 
accustomed to imitating the experimenter only when prompted to do so.  Especially for 
the two participants who received the teacher-directed imitation training for a total of 
twenty trials, it may be that these participants had difficulty transitioning between the 
teacher-directed and child-directed imitation training conditions and therefore have 
struggled to understand what was expected of them.  For example, due to the fact that 
children with ASD typically demonstrate rigid adherence to routines and struggle with 
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flexibility, participants who received twenty sessions of teacher-directed imitation 
training may have become accustomed to the structure of these sessions and had more 
difficulty performing in a very different routine (Ingersoll, 2008). Further research 
examining whether alternative research designs, such as an ABAB pattern alternating 
between teacher-directed and child-directed imitation training, may provide answers to 
this question. 
Finally, it should be noted that John and Daisy failed to consistently demonstrate 
mastery of discrete trial training imitation, therefore limiting the conclusions that can be 
drawn about teacher-directed imitation training’s effects on spontaneous imitation 
development.  It is possible that these participants may have demonstrated different 
performances on the spontaneous imitation assessment had their imitation skills in 
discrete trial training been stronger.  Future research should consider the differential 
length and intensity of interventions needed to be sufficient to not only build corollary 
spontaneous imitation skills but also to strengthen those skills (i.e., elicited imitation) 
directly targeted by the intervention.      
Conclusions 
One of the strengths of the current study is that due to its single subject, multiple 
baseline design, generalizations can be drawn because the design allows for the 
demonstration of cause and effect relationships rather than solely correlations.  While the 
data does not supply strong evidence for the differential effectiveness of either teacher-
directed or child-directed imitation interventions in terms of spontaneous imitation gains, 
the differences in performance observed between participants with higher levels of joint 
attention and lower levels of autism symptoms compared to participants with less 
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developed joint attention skills and higher levels of autism symptoms suggests 
implications for imitation interventions as a whole. 
First, the differences in severity of autism characteristics among participants as 
determined by the ADOS-2 suggests that perhaps children with less severe characteristics 
may more highly benefit from child-directed imitation interventions in comparison to 
children who are more impacted by autism symptomatology.  Additionally, as Daisy and 
John did not evidence an absence of gains entirely, it may be that imitation interventions 
more suited for their level of skill at the time of implementation may prove more 
effective.  In other words, imitation interventions that incorporate additional social 
behavioral aspects, such as joint attention, may serve to supplement the imitation 
component; for example, if an intervention aimed to increase children’s attention to the 
researcher, greater increases in spontaneous imitation may also be achieved. 
Behavioral observations taken from recorded intervention and assessment 
sessions show that Patrick, who showed the strongest gains in spontaneous imitation 
skills over the course of the study, demonstrated evidence of attention to the experimenter 
in contrast with the relatively low levels of this behavior shown in the other two 
participants.  This may suggest the need for clinicians and researchers to assess a child’s 
level of joint attention as well as overall attention to social stimuli (i.e., other individuals) 
prior to the implementation of imitation interventions in order to determine whether a 
child would benefit.  Additionally, if it is determined that a child has relatively low levels 
of attention, it may be helpful to conduct interventions to improve joint attention skills as 
a precursor program for later imitation interventions. 
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Results from the current study also support previous findings that show a link 
between imitation and expressive language skills (e.g., Stone & Yoder, 2001).  Therefore, 
this suggests that imitation interventions may be effective not only for their intended 
purpose but also for increasing expressive language development, even in children who 
are primarily nonverbal.  This finding may be especially useful for short-term treatment 
facilities or treatment providers that are limited on time and resources; by targeting one 
skill, the child may develop further in a collateral skill as well, thereby saving clinician 
resources and serving as an efficient treatment. 
 Finally, this study contributes to the larger body of research on the effectiveness 
of interventions that target essential skills that are often impaired in children with ASD.  
As the prevalence of ASD has been shown to be on the rise, with 1 in 150 diagnosed in 
2000 and now 1 in 68 diagnosed in the latest research, it is imperative for researchers to 
continue to study intervention effectiveness for this population (CDC, 2014).  While 
further research is needed to examine how various factors may contribute to imitation 
intervention effectiveness, this study provides the first known data on the differential 
effectiveness of teacher-directed imitation training in the form of discrete trial training 
versus child-directed imitation training on spontaneous imitation and expressive language 
skills. 
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SPONTANEOUS	  IMITATION	  ASSESSMENT	  –	  BASELINE/CONDITION	  1/CONDITION	  2	  
	  
TASK	   TRIAL	  1	  (1ST	  VERBAL	  PROMPT)	   TRIAL	  2	  (2ND	  VERBAL	  
PROMPT)	  
1.	   	   	  
2.	   	   	  
3.	   	   	  
4.	   	   	  
5.	   	   	  
6.	   	   	  
7.	   	   	  
8.	   	   	  
9.	   	   	  
10.	   	   	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT	  ID	    EXPERIMENTER	    CODER	   	  
DATE	  OF	  
SESSION	  
 DATE	  OF	  
CODING	  
 DOUBLE	  
CODED?	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PARTICIPANT	  
ID	  
 EXPERIMENTER	    CODER	   	  
DATE	  OF	  
SESSION	  
 DATE	  OF	  
CODING	  
 DOUBLE	  
CODED?	  
	  
 
TEACHER	  DIRECTED	  IMITATION	  TRAINING	  (CONDITION	  1)	  
	  
TASK	   PROMPT	  REQUIRED	  (+	  =	  no	  
prompts/independent,	  V	  =	  repeated	  
verbal,	  -­‐	  =	  full	  physical	  
1.	   	  
2.	   	  
3.	   	  
4.	   	  
5.	   	  
6.	   	  
7.	   	  
8.	   	  
9.	   	  
10.	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PARTICIPANT	  CODE:	   CONDITION:	  
EXPERIMENTER:	   	  
	  
EXPRESSIVE	  LANGUAGE	  ASSESSMENT	  
	  
Flower	  
	  
Shoes	  
	  
Door	  
	   	  
House	  
	  
Car	  
	  
Bed	  
	  
Tree	  
	  
Cup	  
	  
Dog	  
	  
Cat	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APPENDIX B 
IMITATION TASKS 
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IMITATION TASKS 
OBJECT 
 
TASK: Clap spoons 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then clap two spoons together.  Follow-up with 
a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond 
after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am clapping the spoons!” and then clap two spoons 
together.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): clap spoons 
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!” (DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Roll car 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then roll the car across the table.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am rolling the car!” and then roll the car across the 
table.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): roll car 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”/ “You’re (something the child is 
doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Place umbrella over head 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put the umbrella over your head.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting the umbrella over my head!” and then 
put the umbrella over your head.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child 
does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically 
prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put umbrella over head 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)! (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Bounce ball 
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DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then bounce the ball once.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am bouncing the ball!” and then bounce the ball 
once.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): bounce ball  
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put pacifier in doll’s mouth 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then place the pacifier in the doll’s mouth 
(make sure the pacifier is already removed from the doll’s mouth).  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am giving baby pacifier!” and then place the 
pacifier in the doll’s mouth.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does 
not respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt 
the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): place pacifier in doll’s 
mouth 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Clap kaleidoscopes 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then clap kaleidoscopes once.  Follow-up with 
a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond 
after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am clapping kaleidoscopes!” and then clap cups 
once.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): clap kaleidoscopes together 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Swing boa 
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DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then swing the boa over your head once.  
Follow-up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does 
not respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am swinging the boa!” and then swing the boa 
you’re your head once.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): swing boa over head once 
(if the child swings the boa over his/her head more than once, still considered a full 
imitation) 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Hold cup to doll’s mouth 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then hold the cup to the doll’s mouth.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child.  Retrieve the ball each time. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am giving the cup to the doll!” and then hold the 
cup to the doll’s mouth.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): hold cup to dolls’ mouth 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put spoon in box 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put the spoon in the box.  Follow-up with 
a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond 
after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting the spoon in the box!” and then hold the 
umbrella over your head.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put spoon in box 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
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TASK: Put blanket on doll 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then lay the blanket on top of the baby doll.  
Follow-up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does 
not respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am covering the baby!” and then lay the blanket on 
top of the baby doll.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): lay blanket on top of baby 
doll 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/ “We’re doing the same thing!” 
(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!”(DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Hold kaleidoscope to eye 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then hold the kaleidoscope to your eye.  
Follow-up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does 
not respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am looking through the tube!” and then hold 
kaleidoscope to eye.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): hold kaleidoscope to eye 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Rock baby doll 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then rock the baby doll in your arms.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am rocking the baby!” and rock the baby doll in 
your arms.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): rock baby doll in arms 
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Roll ball  
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DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then roll the ball.  Follow-up with a second 
identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two 
prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am rolling the ball!” and then roll the ball.  Follow 
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): roll ball  
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put ball in box 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put the ball in the box.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting the ball in the box!” and then put the 
ball in the bucket.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  
If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put ball in box 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good putting ball in bucket!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Shake kaleidoscope 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then shake the kaleidoscope.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am shaking the kaleidoscope!” and then shake the 
kaleidoscope.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): shake kaleidoscope 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Stack bowls 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put one bowls on top of the other.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
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Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am stacking bowls!” and then put one bowl on top 
of the other.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): putting one bowl on top of 
the other 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
 
TASK: Pretend to eat out of bowl with spoon 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then pretend to eat out of the bowl with the 
spoon.  Follow-up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am eating out of the bowl with the spoon!” and then 
pretend to eat out of the bowl with the spoon.  Follow up with a second identical prompt 
if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not 
physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): pretend to eat out of bowl 
with spoon (raise spoon to lips) 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Stack plates 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put one plate on top of the other.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am stacking plates!” and then put one plate on top 
of the other.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put one plate on top of the 
other 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Pretend to drink out of cup 
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DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then pretend to drink out of the cup.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am drinking!” and then pretend to drink out of the 
cup.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child 
does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): hold kaleidoscope to eye 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good drinking!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Stack boxes 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put one box on top of the other.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am stacking boxes!” and then put the hat on the 
doll’s head.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put one box on top of the 
other 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
MOTOR 
 
TASK: Raise hand 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then raise your hand.  Follow-up with a second 
identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two 
prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am raising my hand!” and then raise your hand  
Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does 
not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): raise hand  
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Clap hands 
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DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then clap your hands once.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am clapping my hands!” and then clap your hands 
once.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): clap hands (at least once) 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Thumbs up 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then make a thumbs up gesture.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am giving a thumbs up!” and then make a thumbs 
up gesture.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): make thumbs up gesture 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Wave hand 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then wave your hand.  Follow-up with a second 
identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two 
prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am waving my hand!” and then wave your hand.  
Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does 
not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): wave hand (at least once) 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on wall 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on the wall.  Follow-up with 
a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond 
after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
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Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on the wall!” and then put your 
hand on the wall.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  
If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on wall 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Nod head 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then nod your head once.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am nodding my head!” and then nod your head 
once.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): nod head (at least once) 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Shake head 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then shake your head side to side.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am shaking my head!” and then shake your head 
side to side.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If 
the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): shake head side to side 
Feedback: 
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Point at window 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then point at the window.  Follow-up with a 
second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after 
two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I pointing at the window!” and then point at the 
window.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): point at window 
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Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on cheek 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your cheek.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my cheek!” and then put 
your hand on your cheek.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on cheek 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on nose 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your nose.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my nose!” and then put 
your hand on your nose.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on nose 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on head 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your head.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my head!” and then put 
your hand on your head.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on head 
Feedback:  
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 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Make fist 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then make a fist.  Follow-up with a second 
identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not respond after two 
prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am making a fist!” and then mak a fist.  Follow up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): make a fist 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on shoulder 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your shoulder.  Follow-
up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my shoulder!” an then put 
your hand on your shoulder.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does 
not respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt 
the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on shoulder 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on elbow 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your elbow.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my elbow!” and then put 
your hand on your elbow.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on elbow 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
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 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on table 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on the table.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on the table!” and then put 
your hand on your elbow.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on table 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
 
TASK: Tap table 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then tap the table with your hand.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am tapping the table!” and then tap the table with 
your hand.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the 
child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): tap table with hand 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on neck 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your neck.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my neck!” and then put 
your hand on your neck.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on neck 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
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 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on mouth 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your mouth.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my mouth!” and then put 
your hand on your neck.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not 
respond.  If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the 
child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on mouth 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on eye 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your eye.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my eye!” and then put your 
hand on your eye.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  
If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on eye 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
 
TASK: Put hand on ear 
DTT Administration: Say “Do this!” and then put your hand on your ear.  Follow-up 
with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  If the child does not 
respond after two prompts, physically prompt the child. 
Spontaneous Administration: Say “I am putting my hand on my ear!” and then put your 
hand on your ear.  Follow up with a second identical prompt if the child does not respond.  
If the child does not respond after two prompts, do not physically prompt the child. 
Operational Definition (both for researcher + participant): put hand on ear 
Feedback:  
 If full imitation: “Good doing this!”(DTT)/“We’re doing the same 
thing!”(Spontaneous) 
 If partial/incorrect/no imitation: “Good sitting!” (DTT)/ “You’re (something the 
child is doing at that moment)!” (Spontaneous) 
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APPENDIX C 
PICTURE CARDS 
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Card 1: Dog 
Card 2: Flower 
Card 3: House 
Card 4: Chair 
Card 5: Cat 
Card 6: Car 
Card 7: Soccer ball 
Card 8: Bed 
Card 9: Bird 
Card 10: Bicycle 
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APPENDIX D 
TREATMENT INTEGRITY CHECKLIST 
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CODE DATE EXPERIMENTER TASK YES, 
NO, 
N/A 
TI COMPLETED BY: DATE 
COMPLETED:  
   1. Researcher 
conducts 10 
spontaneous imitation 
assessment trials (5 
object, 5 motor) 
   
   2. C1 only: 
Researcher conducts 
10 imitation training 
trials (5 object, 5 
motor)  
   
   8. C1 only: 
Researcher uses cue 
“Look at me” to get 
participant’s attention 
   
   9. C1 only: 
Researcher says “Do 
this” and models 
action 
   
   10. C1 only: 
Researcher uses 
verbal/physical 
prompts when 
appropriate to 
provide feedback on 
imitation 
performance 
   
   11. C2 only: 
Researcher imitates 
child’s behavior for 
five minutes 
   
